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Designing Truthful Auctions when the agents 
are budget constrained
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Disconnect between
•  how much you value a certain good
•  how much you are able to pay for it
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Most of the budgets related work in 
auction theory..
• Analyzes standard auction mechanisms 
when agents are budget constrained.
• Main motivation was high valued auctions 
such as spectrum auctions or privatization 
auctions.
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Ad auctions introduced budgets into the bidding 
language.
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Design mechanisms with budgets as part of the 
language.
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• A set             (convex and downward closed)
• A point               represents a feasible 
allocation of some abstract good to all the 
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• Player i has 
• value vi per unit of the good  (private information)
• budget Bi    (public information)
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Mechanism Design
Mechanism
(v1, v2, v3, …, vn)
(B1, B2, B3, …, Bn)
(x1, x2, x3, …, xn)         X
(p1, p2, p3, …, pn)
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Desired Properties
• Individual Rationality
• Incentive Compatibility (Truthfulness)
• Maximize Social Welfare
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Desired Properties
• Individual Rationality
• Incentive Compatibility (Truthfulness)
• Maximize Social Welfare
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Pareto-Optimality
A feasible outcome (x,p) is P.O. 
  
  if and only if
    
 There is no other feasible outcome (x’, p’) where either
  1) one of the players’ utility is increased, or 
  2) revenue of the seller is increased, 
  without hurting anyone.
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Properties of P.O. solution
• Allocation x must always be on the Pareto 
boundary of X.
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Properties of P.O. solution
• Allocation x must always be on the Pareto 
boundary of X.
• If the budgets are very large, Pareto-
optimal solution achieves social welfare. 
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Properties of P.O. solution
• Lemma:
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What is known..
• [Dobzinski, Lavi, Nisan ‘08]
• Single divisible good.
• [Fiat, Leonardi, Saia, Sankowski ‘11]
• Coverage-type functions
• [Baldeschi, Henzinger, Leonardi, Starnberger ‘11]
• Scheduling for sponsored-search slots.
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 Dobzinski, Lavi, Nisan [FOCS’08]
• Design a Pareto-optimal auction for single 
divisible good.
    X = 
• Also show that if budgets are private information,  
there is no Pareto optimal auction.
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Fiat, Leonardi, Saia, Sankowski [EC’11]
Agents
Items
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Our Results
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Our Results
• We give a mechanism for any polymatroid P.
• Only need a value oracle.
• Subsumes all the previous results.  
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Applications
• Besides numerous applications of polymatroids, 
we show a new application to Ad auctions.
• Adwords Polytope: An allocation scenario 
capturing multiple keywords and multiple slots 
per keyword.
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Impossibility Result
• There are examples of more general 
polytopes where one cannot achieve the 
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Sketch of our auction
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Clinching Auctions
• Due to [Ausubel 04]
• Ascending price auctions that implement 
VCG for various settings.
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Clinching in Round k
• Say so far will have allocated
• Current price is pk
• How much should each player “clinch” in 
round k?  
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X’ = remnant supply 
polytope 
X’
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Demand of player i
• Let remaining budget of player i in kth 
round is Rik
• If pk ≤ vi, then the maximum amount 
player i can afford is Rik / pk
    di
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X’
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D
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How much should player i clinch?
• Define
   D-i(δi) = { (y1,..,yi-1, yi+1,..,yn) |  (y, δi) ε D }
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D
How much should player i clinch?
D-i(δi) 
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How much should player i clinch?
Clinchi := 
     max δi s.t. D-i(δi) = D-i(0) 
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How much should player i clinch?
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D
How much should player i clinch?
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How much should player i clinch?
Clinchi := 
     max δi s.t. D-i(δi) = D-i(0) 
Q: Can we compute clinchi ?
Theorem:  If P is a polymatroid, clinchi can be 
computed efficiently using submodular minimization.
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Characterization of P.O. solution
• Lemma:
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Going beyond polymatroids…
Extensions and Impossibility Results
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General convex environment
One budget-constrained player
For a single budget constrained player, 
it is possible do design an auction for 
any convex environment.
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What about 2 budget constrained 
players?
Impossibility Result: There exists a 
class of polytopes, for which no auction 
can satisfy all the three properties 
simultaneously.
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Impossibility for decreasing 
marginals
Single divisible good:
Decreasing marginal valuations 
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Summary of our results
• Incentive-compatible, budget feasible and 
Pareto-optimal auction for polymatroidal 
environments
• New application of polymatroids for modelling 
sponsored search environments
• Auction for a generic environment with a single 
budget constrained player
• Impossibility results for environments beyond 
polymatroids
• Impossibility for single divisible-item setting 
decreasing marginal valuations
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Thanks !
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